NOEL A. LASANAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014

CASE DIGEST

NOEL A. LASANAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014

Facts:On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of a marriage license.4 The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license.5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City.6 They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates.8 In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.9

On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single.10 On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City,11 which was docketed as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the award of damages.

In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.13 After due proceedings, the accused was formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed on October 20, 1998 in the RTC, viz: That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with Socorro Patingo and without the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with Josefa Eslaban.

In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its judgment in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage between him and Socorro valid and legal,

On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in Criminal Case No. 49808, disposing thusly: 

WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 

Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.

Issues: W/N that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.26 

Ruling:The appeal lacks merit.This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect.28

Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements attendant. 

The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit: 

Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n) 

The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:29

x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 

In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy had already been filed against him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court has explained that "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

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end notes: 

Formal Requisites