REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs.CELESTINA NAGUIAT, G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006

Case Digest

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs.CELESTINA NAGUIAT, G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006

This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words in bracket added)

Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on its basic submission that the CA’s decision "is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under … (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondent’s occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.

In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:

The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property …. (Word in bracket and underscoring added.)

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.19

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the government.21

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.22

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent’s application for original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED.

SEMIRARA COAL CORPORATION (now SEMIRARA MINING CORPORATION), vs.HGL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and HON. ANTONIO BANTOLO, Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Culasi, Antique, G.R. No. 166854 December 6, 2006

Case Digest 

SEMIRARA COAL CORPORATION (now SEMIRARA MINING CORPORATION), 

vs.HGL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and HON. ANTONIO BANTOLO, Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Culasi, Antique, G.R. No. 166854 December 6, 2006

Petitioner Semirara Mining Corporation is a grantee by the Department of Energy (DOE) of a Coal Operating Contract under Presidential Decree No. 9723 over the entire Island of Semirara, Antique, which contains an area of 5,500 hectares more or less. 4

Private respondent HGL Development Corporation is a grantee of Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement (FLGLA) No. 184 by the then Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources,5 over 367 hectares of land located at the barrios of Bobog and Pontod, Semirara, Caluya, Antique. The FLGLA No. 184 was issued on September 28, 19846for a term of 25 years, to end on December 31, 2009. Since its grant, HGL has been grazing cattle on the subject property.

Sometime in 1999, petitioner's representatives approached HGL and requested for permission to allow petitioner's trucks and other equipment to pass through the property covered by the FLGLA. HGL granted the request on condition that petitioner's use would not violate the FLGLA in any way. Subsequently, however, petitioner erected several buildings for petitioner's administrative offices and employees' residences without HGL's permission. Petitioner also conducted blasting and excavation; constructed an access road to petitioner's minesite in the Panaan Coal Reserve, Semirara; and maintained a stockyard for the coal it extracted from its mines. Thus, the land which had been used for cattle grazing was greatly damaged, causing the decimation of HGL's cattle.

On September 22, 1999, HGL wrote petitioner demanding full disclosure of petitioner's activities on the subject land as well as prohibiting petitioner from constructing any improvements without HGL's permission. Petitioner ignored the demand and continued with its activities.

On December 6, 2000, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) unilaterally cancelled FLGLA No. 184 and ordered HGL to vacate the premises. The DENR found that HGL failed to pay the annual rental and surcharges from 1986 to 1999 and to submit the required Grazing Reports from 1985 to 1999 or pay the corresponding penalty for non-submission thereof.7

HGL contested the findings and filed a letter of reconsideration on January 12, 2001, which was denied by DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez in a letter-order dated December 9, 2002. The DENR stated that it had coordinated with the DOE, which had jurisdiction over coal or coal deposits and coal-bearing lands, and was informed that coal deposits were very likely to exist in Sitios Bobog and Pontod. Hence, unless it could be proved that coal deposits were not present, HGL's request had to be denied.8

HGL sent a letter dated March 6, 2003 to DENR Secretary Alvarez seeking reconsideration. The DENR did not act on the letter and HGL later withdrew this second letter of reconsideration in its letter of August 4, 2003.

On November 17, 2003, HGL filed a complaint against the DENR for specific performance and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 20675 (2003) with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the Caloocan City RTC on December 22, 2003, enjoining the DENR from enforcing its December 6, 2000 Order of Cancellation.

Meanwhile, HGL had also filed on November 17, 2003, a complaint against petitioner for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-146 with the Regional Trial Court of Culasi, Antique, Branch 13.9

On December 1, 2003, the Antique trial court heard the application for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in Civil Case No. C-146. Only HGL presented its evidence. Reception for petitioner's evidence was set to March 23-24, 2004. Petitioner was notified. But, on March 19, 2004, petitioner's President wrote the court asking for postponement since its counsel had suddenly resigned. The trial court refused to take cognizance of the letter and treated it as a mere scrap of paper since it failed to comply with the requisites for the filing of motions and since it was not shown that petitioner's President was authorized to represent petitioner. Because of petitioner's failure to attend the two scheduled hearings, the trial court, in an Order dated March 24, 2004, deemed the application for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction submitted for decision. Meanwhile, petitioner had filed its Answer dated February 26, 2004, raising among others the affirmative defense that HGL no longer had any right to possess the subject property since its FLGLA has already been cancelled and said cancellation had already become final.

The construction of numerous buildings and the blasting activities thereon by the petitioner undertaken without the consent of the private respondent blatantly violates the rights of the latter because it reduced the area being used for cattle-grazing pursuant to the "FLGLA".

From the foregoing it is clear that the three (3) indispensable requisites of a cause of action, to wit: (a) the right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; (c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant is violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages, are PRESENT.

Hence, having established that private respondent herein has a cause of action under the principal action in Civil Case No. C-146, necessarily it also has a cause of action under the ancillary remedy of injunction.

This Court finds that the petitioner was not deprived of due process.

Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Hilario is the only one who is knowledgeable of the facts of the case, still, petitioners cannot claim that there was violation of due process because the "ESSENCE of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard x x x. What the law proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard." In the case at bar, petitioner was given two (2) settings to present its evidence but it opted not to.

Court of Appeals Decision dated January 31, 2005.16

Petitioner submits in the petition now the following grounds:

I.THE RESOLUTION DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION DATED 6 OCTOBER 2004 ISSUED BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT ARE A PATENT NULLITY AS PRIVATE RESPONDENT CLEARLY HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT OR CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER ITS PRINCIPAL ACTION OR COMPLAINT, MUCH LESS, TO THE ANCILLARY REMEDY OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION;

II.A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION CANNOT BE USED TO TAKE PROPERTY OUT OF THE POSSESSION OF ONE PARTY AND PLACE IT INTO THAT OF ANOTHER WHO HAS NO CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT THERETO;

III.PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-146 IS IN THE NATURE OF AN ACCION PUBLICIANA, NOT FORCIBLE ENTRY; HENCE, A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION IS NOT A PROPER REMEDY;

IV.PETITIONER WAS UNJUSTIFIABLY AND ARBITRARILY DEPRIVED OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO THE APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION;

V.THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT DELIBERATELY WITHHELD THE RESOLUTION OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 12 JULY 2004 AND PROCEEDED TO PREMATURELY ISSUE THE PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO FAIR PLAY AND JUSTICE;

VI.PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN:

1) HE REFUSED OR FAILED TO ADMIT AND/OR CONSIDER THE CERTIFIED DENR RECORDS OF THE DENR ORDER CANCELLING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S FLGLA;

2) HE REFUSED OR FAILED TO CONDUCT A HEARING ON THESE CERTIFIED PUBLIC DOCUMENTS WHICH CONCLUSIVELY PROVE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE PRINCIPAL ACTION; AND

3) HE REFUSED OR FAILED TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT OUTRIGHT FOR VIOLATING THE RULES ON FORUM SHOPPING BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT.17

Now on the merits of the instant petition.

The pivotal issue confronting this Court is whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred or committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the September 16, 2004 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Antique granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

Under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, a lawful possessor is entitled to be respected in his possession and any disturbance of possession is a ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the possession.20 Thus, petitioner's claim that the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is improper because the instant case is allegedly one for accion publiciana deserves no consideration. This Court has already ruled in Torre, et al. v. Hon. J. Querubin, et al.21 that prior to the promulgation of the New Civil Code, it was deemed improper to issue a writ of preliminary injunction where the party to be enjoined had already taken complete material possession of the property involved. However, with the enactment of Article 539, the plaintiff is now allowed to avail of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession during the pendency of his action to recover possession.22

It is likewise established that a writ of mandatory injunction is granted upon a showing that (a) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.23

In the instant case, it is clear that as holder of a pasture lease agreement under FLGLA No. 184, HGL has a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the subject property. Recall that under the FLGLA, HGL has the right to the lawful possession of the subject property for a period of 25 years or until 2009. As lawful possessor, HGL is therefore entitled to protection of its possession of the subject property and any disturbance of its possession is a valid ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in its favor. The right of HGL to the possession of the property is confirmed by petitioner itself when it sought permission from HGL to use the subject property in 1999. In contrast to HGL's clear legal right to use and possess the subject property, petitioner's possession was merely by tolerance of HGL and only because HGL permitted petitioner to use a portion of the subject property so that the latter could gain easier access to its mining area in the Panaan Coal Reserve.

The urgency and necessity for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction also cannot be denied, considering that HGL stands to suffer material and substantial injury as a result of petitioner's continuous intrusion into the subject property. Petitioner's continued occupation of the property not only results in the deprivation of HGL of the use and possession of the subject property but likewise affects HGL's business operations. It must be noted that petitioner occupied the property and prevented HGL from conducting its business way back in 1999 when HGL still had the right to the use and possession of the property for another 10 years or until 2009. At the very least, the failure of HGL to operate its cattle-grazing business is perceived as an inability by HGL to comply with the demands of its customers and sows doubts in HGL's capacity to continue doing business. This damage to HGL's business standing is irreparable injury because no fair and reasonable redress can be had by HGL insofar as the damage to its goodwill and business reputation is concerned.

Petitioner posits that FLGLA No. 184 had already been cancelled by the DENR in its order dated December 6, 2000. But as rightly held by the Court of Appeals, the alleged cancellation of FLGLA No. 184 through a unilateral act of the DENR does not automatically render the FLGLA invalid since the unilateral cancellation is subject of a separate case which is still pending before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. Notably, said court has issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the DENR from enforcing its order of cancellation of FLGLA No. 184.

The Court of Appeals found that the construction of numerous buildings and blasting activities by petitioner were done without the consent of HGL, but in blatant violation of its rights as the lessee of the subject property. It was likewise found that these unauthorized activities effectively deprived HGL of its right to use the subject property for cattle-grazing pursuant to the FLGLA. It cannot be denied that the continuance of petitioner's possession during the pendency of the case for recovery of possession will not only be unfair but will undeniably work injustice to HGL. It would also cause continuing damage and material injury to HGL. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of HGL.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CEB SP No. 00035, which affirmed the Resolution dated September 16, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Culasi, Antique, Branch 13, as well as the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction dated October 6, 2004 issued pursuant to said Resolution, is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby lifted. No pronouncement as to costs.

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO,vs.MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BA YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF, BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE, and JOHN and JANE DOES, G.R. No. 211356 September 29, 2014

Case Digest

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO,vs.MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BA YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF, BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE, and JOHN and JANE DOES, G.R. No. 211356 September 29, 2014

Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2 While the company was already operating a resort in the area, the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan,which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.

Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was withinthe "no build zone" demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).3 As provided in the Ordinance:(b) No Build Zone – the space twenty-five (25) meters from the edge of the mean high water mark measured inland;

In rebuttal, respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the company from complying with the Ordinance and Presidential Decree No. 1096 (PD 1096), otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines. Respondents also argued that the demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its assailed Decision dated August 13, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner, according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA on February 3, 2014 through the challenged Resolution. Hence, the instant petition raising arguments on both procedure and substance.

The Issues

Stripped to the essentials, the pivotal issues in the extant case are as follows:

1. The propriety under the premises ofthe filing of a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for declaratory relief;

a. Whether or not declaratory reliefis still available to petitioner;

b. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the respondent mayor was performing neither a judicial nor quasi-judicial function when he ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel;

2. Whether or not respondent mayor committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued EO 10;

a. Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated when the respondent mayor ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel without first conducting judicial proceedings;

b. Whether or not the LGU’s refusal to issue petitioner the necessary building permit and clearances was justified;

c. Whether or not petitioner’s rights under the FLAgT prevail over the municipal ordinance providing for a no-build zone; and

d. Whether or not the DENR has primary jurisdiction over the controversy, not the LGU.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition.

Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy

a. Declaratory relief no longer viable

On the propriety of filing a petition for certiorari, Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. x x x

For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish the concurrence of the following requisites, namely:

1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

3. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.5

Guilty of reiteration, the CA immediately dismissed the Petition for Certiorari upon determining that the first element is wanting—that respondent mayor was allegedly not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions when he issued EO 10.

We are not persuaded.

The CA fell into a trapwhen it ruled that a mayor, an officer from the executive department, exercises an executive function whenever he issues an Executive Order. This is tad too presumptive for it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office,board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not a particular act is a discharge of judicial or quasijudicial functions. The first requirement for certiorari is satisfied if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character.6

It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it issufficient if they are quasi-judicial.7 To contrast, a party is said to be exercising ajudicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, whereas quasi-judicial functionis "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from themas a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."8

In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayor’s finding that Boracay West Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel inMalay, Aklan is illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the respondent mayor’s exercise of quasijudicial functions, against which the special writ of certiorari may lie. Apropos hereto is Our ruling in City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued:9

There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. In determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers.

With the foregoing discussion, the CA erred in ruling that the respondent mayor was merely exercising his executive functions, for clearly, the first requisite for the special writ has been satisfied.

Upon Our finding that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the appropriate remedy, We will proceed to resolve the core issues in view of the urgency of the reliefs prayed for in the petition. Respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion

a. The hotel’s classification as a nuisance

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.12

In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a determination that constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. No buildzones are intended for the protection of the public because the stability ofthe ground’s foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body of water. The ever present threat of high rising storm surges also justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the shoreline. Indeed, the area’s exposure to potential geo-hazards cannot be ignored and ample protection to the residents of Malay, Aklan should be afforded.

Challenging the validity of the public respondents’ actuations, petitioner posits that the hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. Citing Asilo, Jr. v. People,13 petitioner also argues that respondents should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition. Preliminarily, We agree with petitioner’s posture that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se, but not for the reason he so offers. Property valuation, after all, is not the litmus test for such a determination. More controlling is the property’s nature and conditions, which should be evaluated to see if it qualifies as a nuisance as defined under the law.

As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The second is thatwhich depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated with out due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.14

In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since this type of nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding.15 Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.

b. Respondent mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se.16 So it 

Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause,18 property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.

Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.19

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function ast he executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits, to wit:

i. Illegality of structures

In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and exemptions before the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel in Malay, Aklan. To recall, petitioner declared that the application for zoning compliance was still pending with the office of the mayor even though construction and operation were already ongoing at the same time. As such, it could no longer be denied that petitioner openly violated Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which provides:

SECTION 9. – Permits and Clearances.

(a) No building or structure shall beallowed to start construction unless a Building Permit therefore has been duly issued by the Office of the Municipal Engineer.Once issued, the building owner or any person in charge of the construction shall display on the lot or on the building undergoing construction a placard containing the Building Permit Number and the date of its issue. The office of the Municipal Engineer shall not issue any building permit unless:

SECTION 10. – Penalties.

(e) Any building, structure, or contraption erected in any public place within the Municipality of Malay such as but not limited to streets, thoroughfares, sidewalks, plazas, beachesor in any other public place are hereby declared as nuisance and illegal structure.Such building structure or contraption shall be demolished by the owner thereof or any of his authorized representative within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice to demolish. Failure or refusal on the part of the owner or any of his authorized representative to demolish the illegal structure within the period here inabove specified shall automatically authorize the government of the Municipality of Malay to demolish the same, gather and keep the construction materials of the demolished structure. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner cannot justify his position by passing the blame onto the respondent mayor and the latter’s failure to act on his appeal for this does not, in any way, imply that petitioner can proceed with his infrastructure projects. On the contrary,this only means that the decision of the zoning administrator denying theapplication still stands and that petitioner acquired no right to construct on the no build zone. The illegality of the construction cannot be cured by merely tendering payment for the necessary fees and permits since the LGU’s refusal rests on valid grounds.

Alas, petitioner opted to defy the zoning administrator’s ruling. He consciously chose to violate not only the Ordinance but also Sec. 301 of PD 1096, laying down the requirement of building permits, which provides:

ii. Observance of procedural due process rights

In the case at bench, the due process requirement is deemed to have been sufficiently complied with. First, basic is the rule 

Verily, the only grounds invoked by petitioner in crying due process violation are (1) the absence of a court order prior to demolition and (2) the municipal government’s exercise of jurisdiction over the controversy instead of the DENR. Therefore, it can no longer be belatedly argued that the 10-day grace period was not observed because to entertain the same would result in the violation of the respondents’ own due process rights. Given the presence of the requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, whether the building constituted a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens becomes immaterial. The hotel was demolished not exactly because it is a nuisance but because it failed to comply with the legal requirements prior to construction. It just so happened that, in the case at bar, the hotel’s incident that qualified it as a nuisance per accidens––its being constructed within the no build zone––further resulted in the non-issuance of the necessary permits and clearances, which is a ground for demolition under the LGC. Under the premises, a court order that is required under normal circumstances is hereby dispensed with.

d. The FLAgT cannot prevail over the municipal ordinance and PD 1096

According to petitioner, the fact that it was issued a FLAgT constitutes sufficient authorization from the DENR to proceed with the construction of the three-storey hotel.

The argument does not persuade.

The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT are not unbridled. Forestlands, although under the management of the DENR, are not exempt from the territorial application of municipal laws, for local government units legitimately exercise their powers of government over their defined territorial jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the conditions set forth in the FLAgT and the limitations circumscribed in the ordinance are not mutually exclusive and are, in fact, cumulative. As sourced from Sec. 447 (a)(5)(i) of the LGC:

Section 447.Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –

(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipalityand its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

x x x x

(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:

(i) Provide for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks,greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projectsx x x. (emphasis added)

Thus, aside from complying with the provisions in the FLAgT granted by the DENR, it was incumbent on petitioner to likewise comply with the no build zone restriction under Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which was already in force even before the FLAgT was entered into. On this point, it is well to stress that Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner from complying with the restrictions since these provisions adverted to grant exemptions from the ban on constructions on slopes and swamps, not on the no build zone.

Additionally, the FLAgT does not excuse petitioner from complying with PD 1096. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the agreement cannot and will not amend or change the law because a legislative act cannot be altered by mere contractual agreement. Hence, petitioner has no valid reason for its failure to secure a building permit pursuant to Sec. 301 of the National Building Code.

e. The DENR does not have primary jurisdiction over the controversy

Lastly, in ascribing grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of the respondent mayor, petitioner argued that the hotel site is a forestland under the primary jurisdiction of the DENR. Assuch, the merits of the case should have been passed upon by the agency and not by the LGU. In the alternative, petitioner explains that even if jurisdiction over the matter has been devolved in favor of the LGU, the DENR still has the power of review and supervision over the former’s rulings. As cited by the petitioner, the LGC reads:

Section 17.Basic Services and Facilities. –

x x x x

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:

x x x x

(2) For a Municipality:

x x x x

(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects. (emphasis added)

Petitioner has made much of the fact that in line with this provision, the DENR Region 6 had issued anopinion favourable to petitioner.25 To petitioner, the adverted opinion effectively reversed the findings of the respondent mayor that the structure introduced was illegally constructed.

We disagree.

In alleging that the case concernsthe development and the proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, petitioner is skirting the principal issue, which is Boracay West Cove's non-compliance with the permit, clearance, and zoning requirements for building constructions under national and municipal laws. He downplays Boracay West Cove's omission in a bid to justify ousting the LGU of jurisdiction over the case and transferring the same to the DENR. He attempts to blow the issue out of proportion when it all boils down to whether or not the construction of the three-storey hotel was supported by the necessary documentary requirements.

Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasijudicial powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments.1âwphi1 This power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b )(2)(ii), as abovequoted, which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure.1âwphi1 Rather than treating this as an environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle-compliance.

Ultimately, the purported power of review by a regional office of the DENR over respondents' actions exercised through an instrumentality of an ex-parte opinion, in this case, finds no sufficient basis. At best, the legal opinion rendered, though perhaps informative, is not conclusive on the courts and should be taken with a grain of salt.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013 and February 3, 2014, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013

Case Digest

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013

facts:Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the organizational meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of TIPAN, an environmental non-government organization that operates in the municipalities of General Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.2

Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.3

On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.

That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in General Nakar, Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol and Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Administrator, respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of their official position and committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest product) to (person given the permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number) under the pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the government.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a Decision, acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged, to wit:The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport permits with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved to the local government of General Nakar.9 To the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official functions of the DENR.

The Issue

The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of Ruzol for usurpation revolves around the validity of the subject permits to transport, which in turn resolves itself into the question of whether the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the DENR, and no one else.

The Ruling of this Court

The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest products was not included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue transport permits remains with the DENR15and, thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.

We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity. As shall be discussed shortly, the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.

While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs.

On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution16 in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991, which provides:

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphasis Ours.)

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with authority to enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the municipality.17

As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment." In ensuring that this duty is upheld and maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed at enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly, provide adequate measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzol’s memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was in the pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to transport were issued by Ruzol––to regulate the salvaged forest products found within the municipality of General Nakar and, hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the area.19

In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of salvaged forest products through the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared responsibility which may be done either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus: the "LGUs shall share with the national government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the sustainable management and development of the environment and natural resources within their territorial jurisdiction."20 The significant role of the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in Joint Memorandum Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-DILG-LGU Partnership on Devolved and other Forest Management Functions, which was promulgated jointly by the DILG and the DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:

Section 1. Basic Policies

Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the following basic policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-DILG-LGU partnership on devolved and other forest management functions:

1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, protection, proper use and sustainable development of the country’s environment and natural resources.

1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the sustainable management and development of the forest resources within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs shall endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and partnership in forest management.

1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important tools in the holistic and efficient management of forest resources. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs together with other government agencies shall undertake forest land use planning as an integral activity of comprehensive land use planning to determine the optimum and balanced use of natural resources to support local, regional and national growth and development.

1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities in the sustainable management of forest land resources, the DENR, in coordination with DILG, shall enhance the capacities of the LGUs in the various aspects of forest management. Initially, the DENR shall coordinate, guide and train the LGUs in the management of the devolved functions. As the LGUs’ capacity in forest management is enhanced, the primary tasks in the management of devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs and the role of the DENR becomes assistive and coordinative.

1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation with the LGUs shall devolved [sic] additional functions and responsibilities to the local government units, or enter into agreements with them for enlarged forest management and other ENR-related functions.

1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve community empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the partnership and cooperation of the LGUs and other concerned sectors in seeking and strengthening the participation of local communities for forest management including enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations. (Emphasis Ours.)

To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather an additional measure which was meant to complement DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.

This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the government."21 Hence, if there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes, rules or regulations issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to immediately uphold one and annul the other, but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible.22 Accordingly, although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause, complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products.

Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth by law for its enforcement

Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.24 Needless to say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance."25

It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority of the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." It is the Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated by law to enact ordinances against acts which endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of logs and other natural resources.26

In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s Revised Municipal Revenue Code27 and Municipal Environment Code28 reveals that there is no provision unto which the issuance of the permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance for the regulation and transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are infirm.

Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s devolved function to "manage and control communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-3029 is specious. Although We recognize the LGU’s authority in the management and control of communal forests within its territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in accordance with the procedural parameters established by law for its effective and efficient execution. As can be gleaned from the same Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGU’s authority to manage and control communal forests should be "pursuant to national policies and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR."

The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total of 5,000 hectares. (Emphasis Ours.)

It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest, the following requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of potential communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall indicate, among other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued by DENR Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest.

In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these requirements were complied with. Thus, in the absence of an established communal forest within the Municipality of General Nakar, there was no way that the subject permits to transport were issued as an incident to the management and control of a communal forest.

This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory requirements for the issuance of permits to transport foregoes the necessity of obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. As earlier discussed, the permits to transport may be issued to complement, and not substitute, the Wood Recovery Permit, and may be used only as an additional measure in the regulation of salvaged forest products. To elucidate, a person seeking to transport salvaged forest products still has to acquire a Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before obtaining the corresponding permit to transport issued by the LGU.

Main Issue:

Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions

The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions

We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the DENR. 

But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. 

Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.

Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the conduct of the public consultation was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to transport was not Ruzol’s decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of the collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was the participants who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the Mayor of General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter’s authority as local chief executive.47

The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol’s good faith is negated by the fact that if he truly believed he was authorized to issue the subject permits, Ruzol did not have to request the presence and obtain the permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly.48

The graft court’s above posture, however, does not commend itself for concurrence. If, indeed, Ruzol willfully and deliberately intended to usurp the official functions of the DENR as averred by the prosecution, he would not have asked the presence of a DENR official who has the authority and credibility to publicly object against Ruzol’s allegedly intended usurpation. Thus, the presence of PENRO Delgado during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly does not negate, but strengthens Ruzol’s claim of good faith.

As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us, whether in an official or private capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not only a responsibility but also a right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in the responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.

Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising his authority as municipal mayor––an act which was executed with the concurrence and cooperation of non-governmental organizations, industry stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of General Nakar. Admittedly, We consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the settled principle that "all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused."49

In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest products within General Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him criminally liable for these seemingly noble intentions would be a step backward and would run contrary to the standing advocacy of encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and conservation of our natural resources.

Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and considering further that this case demands only the determination of Ruzol's guilt or innocence for usurpation of official functions under the RPC, for which the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to Transport is only subsidiary, We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this instance, pro hac vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s acquittal.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt of the crimes as charged.

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., vs.THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

CASE DIGEST

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., vs.THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

FACTS:(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;

(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];

(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,

Issue: w/n TLA 356 is null and void

After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.

1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374]. . Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have been taken by petitioner until 1986, 

2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.

The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27, 

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.

3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from departing from the general application of the rules enunciated above.

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.